Alain de Benoist says in his essay ‘L’Idée d’Empire’ (English translation at Gornahoor) that empire has a spiritual aspect to its authority, distinct from territorial definition. In consequence, in his judgement, ‘the decline of the empire throughout the centuries is consistent with the decline of the central role played by its principle and, correspondingly, with its movement toward a purely territorial definition’.
In the civilizational ‘great space’ that in English we call China, the anti-Qing movement of Sun Yat-sen was at first a Han ethnic-national movement against Manchu rule; upon the Qing empire’s collapse, however, it became clear to Sun and the rest of the movement that Han ethnonationalism could not hold the territory of the former Qing empire (1644–1912), nor even hold together the various Han peoples inhabiting mostly the territories that had made up the Ming empire (1368–1644). As soon as the anti-Qing revolution had succeeded in destroying Qing rule, it found that classical nationalism was a nonstarter in its own cultural and political context: it could not be the foundation of a Chinese state.
It is tempting, especially from a Chinese ethnocentric perspective, to speak of the former Ming territories as the core of the Qing empire, but even this is a mistake. As de Benoist says of the Holy Roman Empire, ‘L’empire romain germanique ne répond déjà plus à sa vocation quand on tente, en Italie comme en Allemagne, de le lier à un territoire privilégié.’ That is, the Germanic Roman empire no longer answered to its imperial vocation when it tried, as well in Italy as in Germany, to link it to a privileged territory. This idea, de Benoist invites us to note, ‘is still absent in the thought of Dante, for whom the emperor is neither Germanic nor Italic, but “Roman” in the spiritual sense, that is to say, a successor of Cæsar and Augustus’. De Benoist explains about the logic of empire,
L’empire au sens vrai ne peut se transformer sans déchoir en « grande nation », pour la simple raison que, selon le principe qui l’anime, aucune nation ne peut assumer et exercer une fonction supérieure si elle ne s’élève pas aussi au-dessus de ses allégeances et de ses intérêts particuliers. « L’empire, au sens vrai, conclut Evola, ne peut exister que s’il est animé par une ferveur spirituelle […] Si cela fait défaut, on n’aura jamais qu’une création forgée par la violence – l’impérialisme –, simple superstructure mécanique et sans âme ».
In other words, the empire cannot transform itself into a ‘great nation’ without collapsing because, in terms of the principle which animates it, no nation can assume and exercise a superior ruling function if it does not rise above its allegiances and its particular interests. ‘The empire in the true sense’, Evola concludes, ‘can only exist it animated by a spiritual fervor […] If this is lacking, one will only have a creation forged by violence – imperialism – a simple mechanical superstructure without a soul.’
The Qing empire was neither a Han régime nor a Manchu régime, but a unity above both. The most important official documents of the empire were produced in three languages: ‘the Qing language’ (Manchu), Chinese, and Mongolian. In the Forbidden City, the names of buildings were written out in both Manchu and Chinese, and sometimes Mongolian. Within the former Ming lands, Qing ruled in a ‘Chinese’ way, with substantially the same system of provincial governors and mandarins as the Ming empire it had succeeded; in Manchuria, Mongolia, Tibet, and Turkestan, with military governors and vassal rulers.
This is also why, though generally supportive of nationalists in the West in opposition to the common enemy of globalism, I sit lightly on the label for myself. Nation-states are not the only way, and in the case of China with its imperial history – remaining an empire even today, though defectively – I expect the nation-state model will never work.
Cogito, Credo, Petam 